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1 Introduction
1.1 Spanish
La invención de Internet y su exponencial crecimiento desde su creación ha conll-
evado una ingente y creciente cantidad de amenazas: desde robos masivos de datos,
hasta el formar parte de una red ilegal al servicio del mejor postor. En el momento
en que un dispositivo está conectado a esta gran red, la amenaza sobre ese dispositivo
es real, e inminente si no se toma ninguna medida. Para tratar de prevenir estos
problemas, se han propuesto e implementado multitud de medidas, como sistemas
de detección de intrusos, cortafuegos, o, como explicaremos a continuación, listas
blancas y listas negras.
Al hablar de listas nos referiremos al concepto de entidad (o endpoint en inglés)
como una abstracción que abarca IPs (como 8.8.8.8), dominios (como www.wikipedia.org)
y URLs (como http://www.ebay.com/rpp/gift-cards). Una lista negra o blacklist es un
conjunto de entidades o endpoints de las que se sabe que son (o han sido) maliciosas.
Su utilidad dentro de un sistema es la de reaccionar en el momento de conectar con
estas entidades, tomando medidas como por ejemplo bloquear el acceso a ellas. Una
lista blanca o whitelist, por el contrario, es un conjunto de entidades que se consid-
eran no maliciosas. Una de sus más usadas utilidades es la de permitir e-mail de
una serie de proveedores que se sabe que son de conﬁanza (como google mail, yahoo,
hotmail...). En general, un dominio benigno tiene un periodo de vida más largo que
uno malicioso, pues este último en muchas ocasiones hará uso de mecanismos (como
cambiar de nombre regularmente) para precisamente evadir las listas negras. Por
esta razón, la lista blanca es más ﬁable y contiene pocos falsos positivos (hay pocas
entradas en ellas que en realidad sean maliciosas). Nos centraremos a continuación
en las listas negras.
Las listas negras son de gran utilidad en la prevención y deteción de amenazas: En
cuanto una nueva entidad maliciosa es descubierta, es añadida a la lista, y permite
a todas las partes protegidas por dicha lista (por ejemplo, programas antivirus o
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sistemas de detección de intrusos) ser alertadas cuando un dispositivo intente conec-
tarse a ella. Estas listas pueden estar accesibles tanto por la red, como descargables,
tanto públicamente como de forma privada. Por otra parte, hay una serie de cues-
tiones a tener en cuenta al utilizar una lista negra. La primera es que habrá entradas
que no estén actualizadas. Por ejemplo, un dominio puede haber pasado de ser ma-
licioso a no serlo. Para ello a veces se proporciona la fecha en la que fue añadida a
la lista, pero en la práctica esto no ocurre a menudo. El segundo problema es que
pueden darse falsos positivos, esto son, entidades consideradas maliciosas que en el
contexto en que nosotros nos movamos no sea necesario considerarlas como tal. Esto
depende de los criterios que utilice cada servicio de lista negra para bloquear estas
direcciones.
Principalmente por las cuestiones citadas anteriormente, en este proyecto se pro-
pone, se implementa y se evalúa un método de agregación de una serie de listas,
tanto negras como blancas, tanto online como descargables, para entidades de inter-
net. Utilizaremos información extraída de 10 diferentes listas (y servicios en general)
disponibles en la red. A partir de ellas se calculará una reputación para cada entidad,
que se acercará a cero en la medida en que la entidad sea considerada benigna, y a
uno en la que sea considerada maliciosa.
En resumen, el proyecto de un módulo de reputatión para entidades en la red
aporta:
• Una mayor ﬂexibilidad a la hora de decidir qué medidas tomar gracias a un
sistema de reputación continuo en lugar de un valor booleano.
• Reducción del número de falsos negativos, esto es, una mejor tasa de detección
de amenazas gracias a la agregación de diversas listas blancas y negras así como
informes de varios antivirus.
1.2 English
Since internet was invented and due to its rapid growth, the number of threats
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over this big network has constantly increased: from massive data theft, to forming
enormous illegal and malicious networks sold to the best bidder. Malware industry
has become professional, and in the very moment a device is connected to the internet,
it's exposed to all these threats, and they will take place if no measures are taken.
Lots of solutions have been proposed and implemented to prevent and mitigate these
threats, such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), ﬁrewalls, or as we'll explain below,
whitelists and blacklists.
When talking about these lists we are referring to the concept of endpoint, as an
abstraction wrapping IPs (like 8.8.8.8), domains (like www.wikipedia.org) and URLs
(like http://www.ebay.com/rpp/gift-cards). A blacklist is a set of endpoints known
to be (or to have been) malicious. Its function inside a system is to react in the
moment of trying to connect to these endpoints and do something, like blocking the
connection. A whitelist, on the other hand, is a set of endpoints known to be not
malicious. One of the most popular uses of whitelists is to accept e-mail from a set
of reliable mail providers (such as google mail, yahoo, hotmail...). Typically, a benign
domain remains longer than a malicious one, because this last one will often try
to bypass these lists implementing avoidance mechanisms (for example, changing its
name with high frequency). Due to this, whitelists are known to be more reliable and
contain less false positives (this is, less entries on them that are actually malicious).
We'll now focus on blacklists.
Blacklists are very useful in the world of internet security for preventing and detect-
ing threats: In the moment a new malicious endpoint is discovered, it is blacklisted,
and all the systems protected under that blacklist (like antivirus software or IDSs)
are alerted when a device is trying to connect to it. These lists can be accessible
through the web (online) or by downloads (oine), either from a public source or
from a private one. There are some issues to consider when using a blacklist. The
ﬁrst one is that some entries will not be updated, i.e., a domain might have been
malicious in the past, but benign in the current moment. For actually measuring
this, at least a last scan date is required, but this is not often provided by the black-
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list services. A second issue is that in practice there will be false positives, this is,
endpoints ﬂagged as malicious when they are actually benign. This depends on the
criteria used by each blacklist to block these entities.
Mostly for the issues cited above, this project proposes, implements and evaluates
a method of aggregation of several blacklist and whitelist services, both online and
oine, for internet endpoints. The information is extracted from 10 diﬀerent services
available on the cloud. We'll compute a reputation score for each endpoint, that will
approximate to 0 when it's considered benign, and to 1 when is considered malicious.
To sum up, the project of a reputation module for endpoints over the internet
contributes with:
• More ﬂexibility when deciding what measures to take when facing a potentially
malicious endpoint, thanks to a continuous reputation system, instead of a
boolean value.
• A reduction on the number of false negatives, i.e., a better detection rate thanks
to the aggregation of various services like blacklists, whitelists and reports from
antivirus software.
2 Related Work
The eﬃciency and completeness of blacklists has not been widely studied yet. Marc
Kürer et al. [26] designed a multiple blacklist parser, making an aggregation of 49
diﬀerent ones. In a latter study [27], the same team analyzed the eﬀectiveness and
completeness of 15 public malware blacklists and 4 blacklists operated by antivirus
vendors. The second one concludes that individual blacklists (specially public ones
like the ones we'll handle) are by far incomplete, and do not cover all the threats
a system is exposed at all. At the same time, the ﬁrst study shows that there's a
rich amount of useful information when we combine a number of these sources. Our
project will follow this work in a way that makes it more integrable into a real-time
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system, able to come up with an immediate result by evaluating the responses of the
services queried.
On the other hand, reputation systems for web sites have also been studied.
Sushant Sinha et al. [30] made a study over some of the blacklists our module incor-
porates, such as Spamhaus [21], SORBS [2] and SpamCop [1], exclusively in the ﬁeld
of mail spam. These lists also internally implement reputation schemes. The study
concludes that these reputation mechanisms show a rate of false positives and false
negatives higher than it was expected, and a low reaction time for new spammers.
Chia-Mei Chen et al. [25] developed a two-stage method for milking and then sand-
boxing malware samples, detecting drive-by downloads aided by a web reputation
system. However, this reputation is calculated based on a set of features from the
domain itself (such as DNS records, zone, or WHOIS information) and applying some
heuristics to them. Leyla Bilge et al. developed EXPOSURE [23], a system that
employs passive DNS analysis to detect malicious domains. It uses 15 DNS features
(like the Time To Live (TTL), percentage of numerical characters, number of distinct
countries, and more) to separate legitimate domains from malicious (and probably
auto-generated) ones. Another work, from Yuxin Meng and Lam-For Kwok [28], also
utilizes the concept of IP conﬁdence to develop a packet ﬁlter for a Network Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS). As it is a packet ﬁlter, it uses packet-level information to
perform statistical analysis by monitoring the connection in an adaptive manner.
We'll also take into consideration the conclusions from the work of Manos Anton-
akakis et al. [22] about the behaviour of randomly generated domains, frequently
used by malware to bypass blacklisting and signature-based mechanisms. We also
consider how malware downloaders perform their operations: how they spread and
how they are identiﬁed [29] [24]. In addition, as Brett Stone-Gross et al. explain
in their article about the development of FIRE (a tool to spot whole malicious net-
works) [31], there are some ISPs, and networks in general, that exclusively host and
protect criminal activities (such as the Russian Business Network [17]). We'll have
this in mind when querying some services, such as Spamhaus [21], who maintains the
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Don't Route Or Peer (DROP) list, a collection of networks of this type.
3 System Overview
The purpose of the reputation module is to provide reputation information on
diﬀerent types of external endpoints, e.g., IP addresses of hosts that communicate
with internal hosts. This module is aimed to be a support tool for other agents or
users. As to have a general idea, the reputation module is currently being used as
a support tool for the project CADENCE (Cyber Attack Detector Engineering for
Commercial Exploitation) from EIT ICT Labs [12], providing information to speciﬁc
agents about the endpoints the framework is monitoring.
The module provides an API that takes as input an endpoint and outputs a rep-
utation score between zero and one that gives a measure of conﬁdence, with zero
meaning full conﬁdence or benign and one meaning no conﬁdence or mali-
cious. The reputation score is computed by querying 10 external reputation engines
and computing an aggregate score on the combined information they return. In ad-
dition to the reputation score, the module also provides geographical information on
the input endpoint. This is not used for computing the score, but for enriching the
information provided, for example to the human analyst on any alarm raised.
3.1 Architecture Overview
For understanding the design of the reputation module, we introduce the concepts
of engine and service.
Service is an external resource, either online or oine, that can be consulted to
obtain reputation information about a given endpoint. Some (online) services may
ban the IP or key of the requester if it abuses their query rate limit. Some blacklists,
like the ones available from antivirus vendors (such as Bitdefender TraﬃcLight [14],
BrowserDefender [18], or Norton Safe Web [7]) are private and they usually let the
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Figure 1: Overview of an online engine
user look up single endpoints through a web interface, but they don't provide an
API for automated querying. Public services either provide a speciﬁc API (Virus-
Total [15]), use plain HTML (Google Safe Browsing [11]) or implement some other
set of mechanisms like DNS resolution SpamHaus Zen [21].
Engines are components of the reputation module that wrap the process of query-
ing a service. They make transparent to the rest of the module the details of the
operation. Figure 1 represents the basic conﬁguration of an engine for querying an
online service (there are slight diﬀerences between engines querying online and oine
services). First, the Rate Limiter checks if the query limit has been reached for that
session. If it hasn't, it substracts 1 to the current number of available queries and
proceeds. If it has reached the limit, it fails (throwing an error) and does nothing.
On the next step, the Query Encoder wraps the endpoint into a speciﬁc query format
and sends it over the network to the address of the speciﬁc service. The encoding is
service-speciﬁc. This means each engine will implement this step diﬀerently (various
types of encodings will be explained in Section 4.2). When the response from the
server is received, it is decoded by the Response Decoder. All useful information is
analyzed and weighted by the Weighting Algorithm, also diﬀerent for each engine,
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Figure 2: Overview of the module
due to the natural heterogeneity of responses from diﬀerent services. Finally, an ser-
vice reputation score between 0 and 1 is returned, 0 stating it's benign and 1 stating
it's malicious.
Figure 2 shows the high-level structure of the reputation module. It is conformed
by 3 diﬀerent parts, named Guesser, Decider and Merger. A minor part, the Conﬁg-
uration Parser reads all the user-speciﬁc settings from an external ﬁle, such as user
keys for some of the engines, and some others like the window of time in which a scan
will be considered valid, for example for refreshing the cache. The Guesser takes as
input a string representing the endpoint, and infers its type. Then both data are
passed to the Decider, that will decide which engines to query based on the type of
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endpoint received, checking ﬁrst if there's recent data on the cache. It also reads
from the conﬁguration whether to give priority to the oine lists, as an optimization
to consume less queries for the online services. Then the Merger receives a list of
the engine scores from the engines queried by the Decider, and calculates an ﬁnal
score. It also uses the GeoIP component to output geographical information about
the endpoint, speciﬁcally the country and city where the response comes from. It
doesn't use it in the process of calculating the ﬁnal score, but as additional infor-
mation for the ﬁnal user or agent. Finally, it writes the result on the cache and
outputs the ﬁnal score calculated. In Figure 2, the engines are represented as grey
coloured boxes: light grey for engines querying whitelists (AlexaTop, OpendDns and
Dnswl) and a darker grey for engines querying blacklists (MalwareDomains, Google
Safe Browsing, McAfee, and so). Engines taking a ﬁle as input (AlexaTop, OpenDns
andMalwareDomains) are querying oine services and the rest of them are querying
online services.
3.2 External Services
Table 1 summarizes the 10 external services queried by the reputation module. Ser-
vices are compared according to 3 main characteristics: Type of the service: blacklist
(BL), whitelist (WL) and reputation (Rep), type of endpoints they accept: URL,
Domain and IP, and whether it's available online and oine. Out of the 10 services,
5 are blacklists, 3 whitelists and 2 reputation services. Blacklists provide a Boolean
response stating whether the queried endpoint is known to be malicious. Whitelists
provide a Boolean response stating whether the queried endpoint is known to be
benign. Reputation services (McAfee's TrustedSource and VirusTotal) aggregate in-
formation from multiple other detection sources, e.g. from antivirus tools. These 2
services provide enough information to compute an engine score between 0 and 1,
being 0 the most reliable endpoint and 1 a malicious endpoint with total certainty.
These external services can provide information for IPs, URLs, and domains.
Six of the services provide URL reputation and four only IP reputation. Some
like VirusTotal can return information for diﬀerent types of endpoints. For domain
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Engine BL WL Rep. URL Domain IP Online Oine
Alexa [6] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
Dnswl [20] 7 3 7 7 7 3 3 7
Google Safe Browsing [11] 3 7 7 3 7 7 3 7
Malware Domains [5] 3 7 7 3 7 7 7 3
McAfee TrustedSource [13] 7 7 3 3 3 7 3 7
OpenDns [8] 7 3 7 7 3 7 7 3
SORBS [2] 3 7 7 7 7 3 3 7
SpamCop [1] 3 7 7 7 7 3 3 7
Spamhaus Zen [21] 3 7 7 7 7 3 3 7
VirusTotal [15] 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 7
Table 1: External reputation services used.
reputation the module uses the services that have a tick (3) on in either the Domain
or URL columns, e.g., extracting the domain from the URL. For obtaining IP address
reputation, it uses the services that have a tick (3) in the IP column.
The last 2 columns of Table 1 indicate if the service provides an API for re-
mote queries (online) or if they allow the reputation information to be downloaded
(oine). Only three services (Alexa, OpenDns, and Malware Domains) allow down-
loads. From the two Whitelists, OpenDns is run by volunteers, while Alexa is a
service from Amazon. Other commercial services provide an API but do not allow
downloads to protect their intellectual property. Some of the external services are
free. Others provide limited free access and paid subscription levels. Each online ser-
vice, whether free or commercial, has some maximum query rate that the reputation
module enforces through rate-limiting the queries. Paid services (like VirusTotal),
and some free ones (such as Google Safe Browsing), require the use of a private key.
In these two cases a free access key can be obtained by registration. Once obtained,
the reputation module will read these keys from the conﬁguration ﬁle.
The reputation module provides a score for each endpoint based on the combined
information available in all services. Next we provide a brief description of each
individual external service:
1. Alexa [6] provides a ranking of top one million most popular Web domains.
It is not a whitelist per se, but we consider the top 20K domains to be benign.
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2. Dnswl [20] is a DNS-based whitelist that provides reputation information
about IP addresses of known benign mail servers. It is used by email ﬁl-
tering services (e.g., SpamAssasin [9]) to avoid ﬁltering email from whitelisted
senders.
3. Google Safe Browsing [11] provides an HTTP API for querying URLs that
have been identiﬁed by Google to be malicious. For each URL, it returns an
HTTP response in which the body contains malware, phishing, or malware,
phising. It is the service behind the malicious domain protection in the Google
Chrome and Firefox browsers.
4. Malware Domains [5] is oﬀered by the DNS-BH project[19]. It provides
a listing of domains that are known to be used to propagate malware and
spyware. This blacklist is typically used to create DNS zone ﬁles for serving
fake replies to localhost for any requests to these domains.
5. McAfee TrustedSource [13] provides an HTTP API for querying reputa-
tion for URLs based on the McAfee (owned by Intel) internal information. It
classiﬁes URLs as High Risk, Medium Risk, Minimal Risk, Uncategorized
URL, Benign, or Unveriﬁed. The McAfee engine assigns a diﬀerent engine
score to each of these risk levels.
6. VirusTotal [15] accumulates reputation information from many detection en-
gines (e.g., 60 antivirus tools) and other reputation services. It provides an
HTTP-JSON API that can be queried with URLs, domains, IPs, and malware
ﬁles hashes. It is not designed to be used as a blacklist or whitelist directly.
The reputation module outputs an Boolean engine score based on all the in-
formation returned by VirusTotal.
7. OpenDns Top Domains [8] contains the top 10K domain names being
queried to a set of open resolvers placed all over the world. It is not a whitelist
per se, since it only contains the most resolved domains by these servers. De-
spite this, OpenDns states that they remove any suspicious domains from the
list, in this case we'll consider it as a whitelist.
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8. Spamhaus Zen [21] is a DNS-based IP blacklist that accumulates information
from 4 diﬀerent Spamhaus blacklists: XBL for malware-related reports and 3
spam blacklists (SBL, CLSS, PBL).
9. SORBS [2] is a DNS-based blacklist. It can be used to block email from servers
known to disseminate spam, phishing, and other forms of malicious email. It
gives the most descriptive response from all DNS-based IP blacklists including
if the IP is unknown, belongs to a hijacked network, or is a proxy server.
10. SpamCop [1] is a DNS-based IP blacklist that returns a Boolean response.
It is a service by Cisco used for blocking spam servers. They also report the
blacklisted IP addresses to the relevant ISPs.
4 Approach
The API of the module has basically one method get_reputation(endpoint), that
takes a string as an input, representing an endpoint, and returns a reputation score.
There's also a get_rep_from_ﬁle(ﬁle), that takes a ﬁle as input and prints through
the standard output line by line the endpoint and the respective reputation score for
all the endpoints in the input ﬁle (stored in the ﬁle one endpoint per each line).
4.1 Process
When ﬁrst running the program, the reputation module initalizates all the engines,
and calls the Conﬁguration Parser to read all the settings from an external ﬁle that
the Decider will use later. In this section, we'll describe the parts involved from
calling get_reputation to calculating the ﬁnal score. The reputation module can
be called from command line (it will initalizes the module from scratch with every
call) or being imported from within python. In both cases we can optionally specify
the type of the endpoint that we pass as argument.
• From command line:
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python reputation.py google.com
python reputation.py url google.com
In the second case we are indicating that we want google.com to be considered
a url instead of domain, that is the type that the guesser would infer, as we
will see.
• From Python:
>>> import reputation
>>> rp = reputation.ReputationModule()
>>> rp.get_reputation("google.com")
0
>>> rp.get_reputation("google.com","url")
0
Guesser. If the type of the endpoint (i.e., ip, url or domain) is not speciﬁed,
the reputation module will apply regular expression matching to infer it.
1. Four numbers of length up to 3 digits separated by dots is considered an IP.
2. A string followed by a dot, another string, and a slash '/' followed by a string,
is considered a URL. Any string in this context means a non-empty string.
3. The same case as identifying a URL, but if no slash '/' is found at all, or if it's
at the very end of the endpoint string, means it's a domain.
4. In any other case, an error is thrown with Unable to identify the endpoint's
type.
In some cases, the same string can represent either a domain or a URL (like the case
of www.google.com or http://wikipedia.org). These cases will be interpreted as
domains.
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Decider. This component receives the endpoint string along with its type. First,
it checks if the given string is contained in the cache, within the time window deﬁned
in the settings. In a positive hit it will return that result to the merger (this is done
to save online queries). If it's not found in the cache, the Decider will ask one by
one to all the engines if they support that type of endpoint (by calling the public
method engine.has(type) → Bool), and if so, ask for the reputation score for that
given endpoint (with the method engine.query(endpoint, type) → score).
The cache acts as an online service, having the same interface as any other engine,
with the main method LocalDataBaseEngine.query(endpoint, type), and returns null
if the endpoint is not found in it, or it is found with a timestamp older than N
minutes (coded in a global variable). It is queried before any other online service, and
is implemented on a local database. This database has the records of the reputation
scores for endpoints already queried, along with their timestamps. The scores are
stored in the cache and checked automatically by default. The database ignores
what the individual scores from every engine were, to be as compact as possible.
The interface to the local cache is the same as any other engine, with the method
LocalDataBaseEngine.query().
Merge. It takes the reputation scores from all engines and calculates a global
reputation score S through a given function. It calculates it as follows:
R = 1−
N∏
i=1
(1−Ri)
Where R is the ﬁnal reputation and Ri are the engine reputations from the individual
engines. The function assumes 0 < Ri < 1 for all individual scores. Calculating R
this way has the following properties:
1. The higher the score for R, the more likely it is that the endpoint is malicious.
2. If any one of the engines outputs a 1, that means the endpoint is considered
malicious for at least 1 service, so the ﬁnal reputation R will also be 1 for sure
(certainly malicious).
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(a) max(Ri) (b) R = 1−
N∏
i=1
(1−Ri)
Figure 3: Values of max(Ri) vs. Values of R for N = 2
This function is close to max(Ri). Figure 3 represents the reputation score R for
N = 2, with N being the number of engines used for that endpoint. After merging
the scores, the reputation module returns the ﬁnal value R as a result of the previous
calculation.
TheGeoIP component is able to output the country and city where is hosted the
endpoint at that given moment. It doesn't have any eﬀect over the score, but might
reveal useful information for the human analyst or end user. It operates over 2 local
databases, and is accessed via its own python module geoip2.database. The inter-
face the reputation module oﬀers is formed by the (private) methods __get_country(endpoint)
and __get_city(endpoint), which are called by the Merger.
4.2 Querying Online Services
To obtain reputation information about an endpoint, the module checks ﬁrst on the
oine lists. If it doesn't succeed (doesn't ﬁnd information on them) then it proceeds
to query the described online services. This step is implemented diﬀerently on each
one. We'll describe how it's done for the various engines.
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DNS-based engines are used for obtaining information only about IPs. As it
will be explained, they don't provide a big amount of information. The process of
querying a DNS-based service is the following. We have an IP, we'll name 1.2.3.4, that
we want to check. We have a service, hosted in zen.spamhaus.com (for example) that
will respond to our query. With this names, the querying process is the following:
1. Put the IP in reverse order. 1.2.3.4 → 4.3.2.1.
2. Prepend the reversed ip to the URL provided by the organization for that
service, with a dot between them. In this case we will prepend 4.3.2.1 to
zen.spamhaus.org to obtain 4.3.2.1.zen.spamhaus.org.
3. Now we resolve the domain 4.3.2.1.zen.spamhaus.org through DNS resolution.
4. In the case it is successfully resolved, the resulting IP for the A record will
be actually encoding a response code. The meaning of this response code is
the one that the owners of the service want it to be, so they'll have a (public)
speciﬁcation on what the response code means, and how to interpret it. In our
case of zen.spamhaus.org, let's assume the domain 4.3.2.1.zen.spamhaus.org
resolves to 10.0.0.7. Then according to their documentation, we must take
just the last chunk of the IP as the response code. In this case this code is 7,
which means it comes from the XBL list, so it's a 3rd party exploit, such as
a Trojan. In the case the endpoint is not in the database, they normally are
unable to resolve it (return an NXDOMAIN DNS response).
The services Dnswl, SORBS, SpamHaus, and SpamCop belong to this category. The
codes returned range from blacklisted and not blacklisted in the case of SpamCop,
to up to 12 diﬀerent classiﬁcations in the case of SORBS.
HTTP-based engines like Google Safe Browsing, McAfee, and VirusTotal. They
work by sending an HTTP GET request to the URL of the service, with the param-
eters for the query on it, like the API key of the user (in the case of Google and
VirusTotal) and the endpoint in any case. There are some extra ﬁelds, depending
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on the requirements of each service. As an example, this is a query to Google Safe
Browsing for the URL http://ianfette.org/ (malware):
https://sb-ssl.google.com/safebrowsing/api/lookup?client=demo-app&
key=12345&
appver=1.5.2&
pver=3.1&
url=http%3A%2F%2Fianfette.org%2F
Google returns plain text in the body of the response. McAfee returns HTML hy-
pertext and VirusTotal a JSON response, where ﬁelds have aggregated information
from several services like antiviruses and antispyware.
4.3 Calculating Final Score
The responses from each service will be interpreted diﬀerently. In the case of black-
lists and whitelists (the ones marked with a tick (3) on the columns BL and WL in
Table 1), the information extracted is simpliﬁed to a Boolean value encoding found
or not found.
In the case of reputation services (the ones marked with a tick on the column
Rep of 1), we consider there is enough information on the response to weight a more
precise score between 0 (benign) and 1 (malicious).
• McAfee TrustedSource outputs the messages High Risk, Medium Risk,
Minimal Risk, as well as Uncategorized URL, Benign, or Unveriﬁed. We
interpret these levels of risk as diﬀerent engine scores, being:
 Engine reputation = 1 for High Risk
 Engine reputation = 0.5 for Medium Risk
 Engine reputation = 0.3 for Unveriﬁed
 Engine reputation = 0 for Minimal Risk, Benign, and Uncategorized
URL
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These are the messages we have found so far. As there is no public docu-
mentation on the possible messages that the service can return, the reputation
module throws a warning in the case it reads a new type of message that wasn't
seen here, encouraging the developer to add it and assign it an engine score on
the previous table.
• VirusTotal returns a whole JSON ﬁle as response. This ﬁle comprises multiple
sections that are present only if VirusTotal has information to ﬁll them. The
weighting algorithm from the engine considers only the entries detailed below,
if present:
 Category is a string showing a classiﬁcation of the domain. The ones we
consider special cases are Personal storage, Filesharing and Computers
and software.
 Detected downloaded samples is the number of reported downloadable ﬁles
that were recognized to be malicious by one or more antiviruses, with the
number of positives and the scan date. An entry example of this section
is:
"detected_downloaded_samples": [{"date": "2014-03-15 22:38:53",
"positives": 1,
"total": 38,
"sha256": "469d9d7329f5d8dfc1ce10368e5f837b6471
efb3e99bd71e8026bd454d7234ba"}]
 Detected urls is the number of URLs hosted in that domain that were
ﬂagged as malicious by one or more antiviruses, with the number of posi-
tives and the scan date. An entry example of this section is:
"detected_urls": [{"url": "http://nvidia.com/",
"positives": 1,
"total": 59,
"scan_date": "2014-10-03 14:01:30"}]
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This JSON structure only holds for domains. The structure when querying
for a URL is completely diﬀerent, and it doesn't have the sections mentioned.
So this engine will handle URLs by exploring the corresponding domain. This
gives information not only about the asked endpoint, but about any other
resource hosted under the same domain. VirusTotal aggregates a lot of data
from diﬀerent antiviruses, and the response just shows this information. The
objective of the VirusTotal engine is to behave as any other blacklist, returning
an engine score of 0 (benign) or 1 (malicious), considering the ﬁelds mentioned
before. The algorithm is implemented as follows:
1. Create a threshold. The idea of the threshold is to relatively measure
if there are too many malicious sources inside the domain. As some cat-
egories have more downloadable ﬁles and URLs than others, we consider
the Category ﬁeld to adjust the threshold in the special cases mentioned
before. If the domain is the type Personal storage, Filesharing or Com-
puters and software, it's reasonable to consider that there might be some
malicious sources, but we cannot ﬂag the whole domain as malicious. The
reputation will consider a threshold of 15 malicious sources for these cat-
egories, and 3 for the rest of them.
2. Count malicious downloaded ﬁles. If the number of malicious ﬁles
hosted by the endpoint overcomes the previous threshold, it will be ﬂagged
as malicious. However, two observations are made here:
(a) Window of time. VirusTotal scanned sources (both downloaded
ﬁles and detected urls) have a last scanned date. If this date is too
old, it means that no entity has requested a scan of this source in a
long time, either because it hasn't showed any malicious behaviour or
because it probably doesn't exist anymore. Motivated by this obser-
vation, we consider a way to implement this in the algorithm. The
last scan date is compared with the current date, and old scans are
ignored, as they are usually either removed or sinkholed. This window
of time is set in the conﬁguration ﬁle of the reputation module, indi-
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cating the maximum number of minutes before ignoring that entry,
and by default is set to 129600 minutes (90 days).
(b) False positives are situations in which a source is misinterpreted as
malicious when in reality is not. The number of positives over these
sources is sometimes very low (typically only 1 or 2 antiviruses raising
an alarm). The probability that these are false positives is very high.
That's why the engine also deﬁnes the minimum number of positives
(3 by default) before considering the result a real threat.
After applying these ﬁlters, we compare the number of positives with
the global threshold (either 3 or 15 depending on the category of the
endpoint), and ﬂag it as malicious if it corresponds.
3. Count malicious URLs. In the case it is not ﬂagged with the previous
step, the same process as with malicious downloaded ﬁles is applied with
the entry malicious urls.
5 Evaluation
For the evaluation of the reputation module, we ﬁrst have to acquire a set of benign
endpoints to consider it ground truth. This is not an easy task, since it's not trivial
to know if a speciﬁc domain contains any malicious threats. Specially, when we are
testing the mechanisms in which we normally rely to get the reputation for those
endpoints.
In this ﬁrst test case, we consider the Alexa top 5000 ﬁle, a subset of the Alexa
top 1 million ﬁle that the module uses, to test the online services able to query
URLs. The entries of this ﬁle are not ensured to be benign on their totality, but they
are a good approximation easily and publicly available. We'll the engines McAfee
TrustedSource, Google Safe Browsing, and MalwareDomains. Since this speciﬁc test
focuses on false positives, we'll run the VirusTotal engine only over the positives
from these 3 engines. The reason is that VirusTotal service with a free license key
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has a very low query rate limit (4 queries per minute) and it totally bottlenecks the
test. The results over this ﬁrst step are shown in Table 2. Each row classiﬁes results
from each engine (McAfee TS, Google SF, and MalwareDomains). Columns display
the number of endpoints scoring that ﬁnal reputation, along with the percentage of
the total number of endpoints tested on the Alexa top 5000. The last row displays
these numbers for the ﬁnal score of the reputation module.
Reputation Score: 0 0.3 0.5 1
Endpoints by McAfee TS 4496 (89.92%) 407 (8.14%) 46 (0.92%) 51 (1.02%)
Endpoints by Google SB 4989 (99.78%) - - 11 (0.22%)
Endpoints by Mal.Domains 4993 (99.86%) - - 7 (0.14%)
Final Score 4491 (89.82%) 405 (8.10%) 45 (0.90%) 59 (1.18%)
Table 2: Reputation Scores for Alexa Top 5K Domains using 3 engines querying
domains
We consider endpoints with a ﬁnal reputation score of 1 to be false positives. Over
these 59 endpoints, we now study the individual scores returned by the involved
engines. In 55 out of 59 cases this score is either 0 or 1 for all engines, except for the
endpoints t60gfsm.com and ﬁndamo.com (engine reputation of 0.5 by McAfee)
and downloadha.com and 0427d7.se (engine reputation of 0.3 by McAfee). Fig-
ure 4 shows the number of endpoints ﬂagged by each engine and the intersections
between these sets. As we've said earlier, it's not trivial to know if a score reﬂects
a false positive. McAfee TrustedSource raises a big amount of false positives, as
we can see that 37 out of the 59 endpoints are ﬂagged as malicious exclusively by
this engine, meaning High Risk according to McAfee's results. At the same time,
VirusTotal and Google Safe Browsing engines don't ﬂag a big number of domains
as malicious, meaning their false positive rate is low. Blacklists usually take good
care of having a low false positive rate, because in practice it's better to miss some
malicious endpoints than to block legitimate ones. As we see in Figure 4, there are
2 domains considered malicious by McAfee, Google and VirusTotal. These domains
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Figure 4: Number of endpoints ﬂagged as malicious by each engine and intersections
between them
are secure-master.com and security-upgrade.com. We can say that these 2 do-
mains are actually true positives, i.e., they are ﬂagged as malicious, and are indeed
malicious even though they are in Alexa top 5000.
In a second test case, we aimed to spot false negatives, i.e., domains ﬂagged as
benign when in fact they are malicious. For this, we would ideally need a ground
truth for positive cases, this is, a set of endpoints for which we certainly know they
are all malicious. This time we consider the updated ﬁle Malicious Domains, also
part of the reputation module. This ﬁle contains updated entries of very recently
detected malicious domains. We take the ﬁrst 3000 endpoints of this ﬁle, correspond-
ing to malicious domains reported from 20-12-2014 to 29-12-2014. Table 3 shows 4
reputation values, the number of endpoints from the MalwareDomains ﬁle scoring
those values, and the percentage that they sum up over the total number of entries.
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Final Reputation Score: 0 0.3 0.5 1
Number of Domains 147 (4.90%) 13 (0.43%) 22 (0.73%) 2818 (93.93%)
Table 3: Final Reputation Scores for MalwareDomains top 3000 querying the services
McAfee TS and Google SB
A 4.90% of the endpoints in the ﬁle are considered false negatives. This is a reasonable
number. Once again, we are not completely sure if these are true false negatives,
as some of them might have been malicious when they were spotted, and not be
malicious at the moment of the test. But in this case, the oldest entries were spotted
two weeks before the moment of the evaluation, so we'll consider this window to be
thick enough to assume they are false negatives.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work we aggregate 10 lists (5 blacklists, 3 whitelists and 2 reputation lists)
and calculate a joint reputation score by gathering information about a given end-
point of type IP, URL or domain. In addition, we extract geographical information
for the end user. We take into consideration the rate limit for every diﬀerent service,
and in order to boost the number of queries we implement a cache to return recently
queried data. The approach of the reputation module has the advantage of relying on
multiple services, with the objective of reducing the number of false negatives, and
at the same time it goes beyond considering an endpoint either malicious or benign.
The reputation score conveys a scale of risk, obtaining a wider spectrum of tolerance
when considering an endpoint malicious or not. To conclude, we cite the results on
section 5 about the evaluation of the module, approximating at this point a false
positive rate of 1.18% for the 5000 most visited domains on the internet, and a false
negative rate of 4.90% for 3000 malware samples detected on the past 2 weeks.
As future work, we propose integrating Mozilla's Public Suﬃx List [10] as a way
to extract the real domain from the endpoint. At the moment, the reputation is
calculated for the Second Level Domain (SLD) assuming this is the authority re-
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sponsible for all its subdomains. As an illustrative example, the reputation score for
the domain example.co.uk will be calculated over co.uk, even though the co.uk SLD
is not responsible for the domain example.co.uk. So in the case there is a good.co.uk
benign domain and a bad.co.uk malicious one, the whole domain co.uk will have a
ﬁnal reputation close to 1, indicating that is malicious, and by doing so we are also
banning good.co.uk.
Furthermore, a more exhaustive evaluation over the completeness and correctness
of the reputation score of the concrete engines is proposed. By doing so, diﬀerent al-
gorithms for calculating the ﬁnal score can be tested, and the one with the best results
shall be picked. Also, the detection rate would grow by aggregating more blacklists,
specially for speciﬁc threats such as banking Trojans (Zeus and SpyEye) [3], worms
(Palevo) [3], malware like Citadel [4], and domains generated by Domain Generation
Algorithms (DGAs) [16].
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